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Abstract—We consider a covert communication scenario where
a transmitter wishes to communicate simultaneously to two
legitimate receivers while ensuring that the communication is not
detected by an adversary, the warden. The legitimate receivers
and the adversary observe the transmission from the transmitter
via a three-user discrete or Gaussian memoryless broadcast
channel. We focus on the case where the “no-input” symbol is not
redundant, i.e., the output distribution at the warden induced by
the no-input symbol is not a mixture of the output distributions
induced by other input symbols, so that the covert communication
is governed by the square root law, i.e., at most Θ(
√
n) bits
can be transmitted over n channel uses. We show that for such
a setting, a simple time-division strategy achieves the optimal
throughputs for a non-trivial class of broadcast channels; this
is not true for communicating over broadcast channels without
the covert communication constraint. Our result implies that a
code that uses two separate optimal point-to-point codes each
designed for the constituent channels and each used for a fraction
of the time is optimal in the sense that it achieves the best
constants of the
√
n-scaling for the throughputs. Our proof
strategy combines several elements in the network information
theory literature, including concave envelope representations of
the capacity regions of broadcast channels and El Gamal’s outer
bound for more capable broadcast channels.
Index Terms—Covert communication, Low probability of de-
tection, Broadcast channels, Time-division, Concave envelopes
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent surge of research interest in
reliable communications in the presence of an adversary, or
a warden, who must be kept incognizant of the presence
of communication between the transmitters and receivers.
The lack of communication is modelled in discrete channels
by sending a specially-designed “no-input” symbol 0 ∈ X
(where X , a finite set, is the input alphabet of the discrete
channel); in Gaussian channels, it is also modelled as sending
0 ∈ R. This line of research, known synonymously as
covert communications, communication with low probability
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of detection (LPD) [2]–[4], deniability [5], [6], or undetectable
communication [7], seeks to establish fundamental limits on
the throughputs to communicate to the legitimate receiver(s)
while ensuring that the signals observed by the warden are
statistically close to the signals if communication were not
present. It was shown by Bash et al. [2] that in the point-to-
point setting, if the legitimate user’s channel and the adver-
sary’s channel are perfectly known, the number of bits that
can be reliably and covertly transmitted over n channel uses
scales at most as Θ(
√
n) for additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channels. This is colloquially known as the square
root law (SRL). For discrete memoryless channels, the covert
communication is also governed by the SRL if the no-input
symbol is not redundant, i.e., the output distribution at the
warden induced by the no-input symbol is not a mixture of the
output distributions induced by other input symbols. Recently,
the optimal pre-constant in the Θ(
√
n) term has also been
established by Bloch [8] and Wang, Wornell and Zheng [9].
In this paper, we extend the above model and results to a
multi-user scenario [10] in which there is one transmitter, two
legitimate receivers and, as usual, one warden. See Fig. 1. We
are interested in communicating reliably and simultaneously
to the two receivers over the same medium while ensuring that
the warden remains incognizant of the presence of any com-
munication. We call our model a two-user discrete memoryless
broadcast channel (BC) with a warden. This communication
model mimics the scenario of a military general delivering
commands to her/his multiple subordinates while, at the same
time, ensuring that the probability of the communication being
detected by a furtive enemy, the warden, is vanishingly small.
Note that the enemy is not interested in the precise commands
per se but on whether or not communication between the
general and her/his subordinates is actually happening in order
to pre-empt a possible attack. We establish the fundamental
limits for communicating in this scenario when the no-input
symbol is not redundant. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that
the most basic multi-user communication scheme of time-
division [10, Sec. 5.2] is optimal for a class of BCs. This
implies that a code designed for such BCs that uses two sep-
arate point-to-point codes, each designed for the constituent
channels and each used for a fraction of the time (blocklength)
is optimal in the sense that it achieves the best constants of
the
√
n-scaling of the throughput. We would like to emphasize
that time-division is not optimal for the vast majority of BCs
in the absence of the covert communication constraint [10,
Chapters 5 & 8]. In fact, the set of BCs for which time-division
is optimal without the covert communication constraint has
measure zero but with the covert communication constraint,
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Fig. 1. Illustration of two-user BC with a warden. The key which is accessible to f, ϕ1, and ϕ2 is not shown here.
this measure is not zero (see Fig. 3).
A. Related Work
Covert communication is related with steganography in the
sense that both aim to hide information against a warden. In
many instances of steganography, the SRL has been observed
[11]–[16]. In steganography, a cover text is given to the
encoder and a message is embedded into the cover text when
the communication is active. The message-embedded text is
called the stegotext and the warden should not be able to
distinguish the stegotext from the cover text. In particular, a
setup closely related to our problem is the scenario in which
the stegotext is generated through a memoryless channel as
in [13]–[15]. It is interesting to observe that for steganography,
a source sequence (cover text) is given to the encoder and
the encoder controls the channel (regarding the cover text as
the input and the stegotext as the output), while in covert
communications, the encoder generates a source sequence
(codeword) for each message and then the source sequence
is sent through a given communication channel. Since the
given condition and the control function are swapped, the two
classes of problems require different analyses. For example,
the positive steganography rate shown in [17] relys on the fact
that the encoder can modify some part of the covertext, while
such a technique is not applicable in standard communication
systems unless the transmitter has access to the warden’s noise.
This paper focuses on the information-theoretic aspects of
covert communications for which there has been a flurry
of recent work. In particular, refined asymptotics on the
fundamental limits of covert communications over memoryless
channels from the second-order [18] and error exponent [19]
perspectives have been studied. In addition, the fundamental
limits of covert communications for channels with random
state known at the transmitter [20] and classical-quantum
channels [21] have also been established. In contrast, work on
multi-user extensions of covert communications is relatively
sparse. Of note are the works by Arumugam and Bloch [22],
[23]. In [22], the authors derived the fundamental limits of
covert communications over a multiple-access channel (MAC).
The authors showed that if the MAC to the legitimate receiver
is “better”, in a precise sense, than the one to the adversary,
then the legitimate users can reliably communicate on the
order of Θ(
√
n) bits per n channel uses with arbitrarily LPD
without using a secret key. The authors also quantified the pre-
constant terms exactly. In [23], the authors considered a BC
communication model. However, note that the model in [23]
is significantly different from that in the present work. In [23],
the authors were interested in transmitting two messages,
one common and another covert, over a BC where there
are two receivers, one legitimate and the other the warden.
The common message is to be communicated to both parties,
while the covert message has LPD from the perspective of
the warden. This models the scenario of embedding covert
messages in an innocuous codebook and generalizes existing
works on covert communications in which innocent behavior
corresponds to lack of communication between the legitimate
receivers. In our work, there are three receivers, two legitimate
and the other denotes the warden. Both messages that are
communicated can be considered as covert message from the
perspective of the warden. See Fig. 1 for our model.
B. Main Contribution
Our main contribution is to establish the covert capacity
region (the set of all achievable pre-constants of the through-
puts which scale as Θ(
√
n)) of some two-user memoryless
BCs with a warden when the no-input symbol is not re-
dundant. While the (usual) capacity region of the two-user
discrete memoryless BC is a long-standing open problem in
network information theory, we show that under the covert
communications constraint, the covert capacity region admits a
particularly simple expression for a class of BCs we explicitly
identify (see Condition 1). This region implies that time-
division transmission is optimal for this class of two-user BCs.
We emphasize the BC does not have to be degraded, less noisy
or more capable [10, Chapter 5]. Our main result is somewhat
analogous to that of Lapidoth, Telatar and Urbanke [24] who
showed that time-division is optimal for wide-band broadcast
communication over Gaussian, Poisson, “very noisy” channels,
and average-power limited fading channels. However, the
analysis in [24] is restricted to stochastically degraded BCs.
The first analytical tool that is used to prove our main
theorem is a converse bound derived by El Gamal [25] initially
designed for more capable BCs. However, it turns out to be a
useful starting point for our setting. We manipulate this bound
into a form that is reminiscent of an outer bound for degraded
BCs. Subsequently, we express the λ-sum throughput of this
outer bound, for appropriately chosen λ ≥ 1, in terms of upper
concave envelopes [26]. This circumvents the need to identify
the optimal auxiliary random variable for specific BCs. The
identification of optimal auxiliaries is typically possible only
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Fig. 2. Illustration of intuition of optimality of time-division. Shaded (resp. unshaded) boxes indicate that that coordinate equals 1 (resp. 0). Because un1 (w1)
and un2 (w2) are very sparse, the set of locations of the 1’s in x
n(w1, w2) is highly likely to be a disjoint union of those in un1 (w1) and u
n
2 (w2).
if the BC possesses some special structure. For example for
the binary symmetric BC, Mrs. Gerber’s lemma [27] is a key
ingredient in simplifying the converse bound. Similarly for
the Gaussian BC, a highly non-trivial result known as the
entropy power inequality [28], [29] is needed to obtain an
explicit expression for the capacity region. Note that both
these channels are degraded. Our main results applies to some
classes of two-user discrete memoryless BCs (that do not
subsume degraded BCs nor is subsumed by degraded BCs).
We employ concave envelopes and take into consideration that
under the covertness constraint, the weight of the codeword is
necessarily vanishingly small [8], [9]. Augmenting some basic
analytical arguments (e.g., [8, Lemma 1]) to these existing
techniques allows us to simplify the outer bound to conclude
that the time-division inner bound [10, Sec. 5.2] is optimal for
a class of BCs.
C. Intuition Behind The Main Result
We now provide intuition as to why time-division trans-
mission is optimal for some BCs with covertness constraints.
Since symmetric channels satisfy our condition (point 3 in
the discussion following Condition 1), we use the binary
symmetric BC [10, Example 5.3], degraded in favor of Y1
(say), as an example to illustrate this. Let Yj = X ⊕ Ψj
where Ψj ∼ Bern(pj) for j = 1, 2, i.e., the channel
from X to Yj is a binary symmetric channel (BSC). It is
well known that in the absence of the covertness constraint,
superposition coding [10, Sec. 5.3] [30] is optimal, and time-
division transmission is strictly suboptimal (unless the trans-
mitter communicates with only a single receiver). The coding
scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 where un1 (w1), u
n
2 (w2) ∈ Fn2
are generated independently, un2 (w2) denotes the cloud center
and xn(w1, w2) = un1 (w1) ⊕ un2 (w2) denotes the satellite
codeword. Because in covert communications, xn(w1, w2) is
required to have low (Hamming) weight [8], [9], either both
un1 (w1) and u
n
2 (w2) have low weight or both have high weight.
Let us assume it is the former without loss of generality. Then,
the set of locations of the 1’s in the satellite codeword is likely
to be a disjoint union of the sets of 1’s in un1 (w1) and u
n
2 (w2).
Thus the relative weight of xn(w1, w2), denoted as αn, can be
decomposed into the relative weights of un1 (w1) and u
n
2 (m2),
denoted as ραn and (1−ρ)αn respectively for some ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, the superposition coding inner bound for the degraded
BC [10, Theorem 5.2] [30] with X = U1 ⊕ U2 reads
R1 ≤ I(X;Y1|U2) = I(U1;U1 ⊕Ψ1) ≈ ραnL∗1, (1)
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2) = I(U2;U2 ⊕ Ψ˜2) ≈ (1− ρ)αnL∗2, (2)
where L∗1 and L
∗
2 are the “covert capacities” [8], [9] of
the constituent point-to-point binary symmetric channels (see
Theorem 1) and Ψ˜2 := U1⊕Ψ2 is a Bernoulli random variable
with parameter ραn∗p2 ≈ p2 due to the low weight constraint
on U1 (its relative weight is ραn). Thus, (1) and (2) suggest
that time-division is optimal, at least for symmetric BCs but
we show the same is true for a larger class of BCs.
D. Paper Outline
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we
formulate the problem and define relevant quantities of interest
precisely. In Section III, we state our assumptions and main
results. We also provide some qualitative interpretations. The
main result, corollaries, and bounds on the required length
of the secret key are proved in Sections IV, V, and VI
respectively. We conclude our discussion in Section VII where
we also suggest avenues for future research.
E. Notation
We adopt standard information-theoretic notation, following
the text by El Gamal and Kim [10] and on occasion, the book
by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [31]. We use hb(q) := −q log q −
(1 − q) log(1 − q) to denote the binary entropy function.
D(P‖Q) := ∑z P (z) log P (z)Q(z) and V(P,Q) := 12 ∑z |P (z)−
Q(z)| are the relative entropy and the total variation distance
respectively. We use I(X;Y ) and I(P,W ) to denote the
mutual information of (X,Y ) ∼ P ×W . Throughout log is
taken to an arbitrary base. We also use h(·) to denote the
differential entropy. The notation a ∗ b := a(1− b) + b(1− a)
denotes the binary convolution operator. For two discrete
distributions, P and Q defined on the same alphabet X , we
say that P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q, denoted
as P  Q if for all x ∈ X , Q(x) = 0 implies that P (x) = 0.
Other notation will be introduced as needed in the sequel.
4II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A discrete memoryless1 two-user BC with a warden
(X ,Y1,Y2,Z, PY1,Y2,Z|X) consists of a channel input al-
phabet X , three channel output alphabets Y1, Y2, and Z ,
and a transition matrix PY1,Y2,Z|X . The output alphabets Y1
and Y2 correspond to the two legitimate receivers and Z
corresponds to that of the warden. Without loss of generality,
we let X = {0, 1, . . . ,K}. We let 0 ∈ X be the “no
input” symbol that is sent when no communication takes place
and define Qx = PZ|X(·|x) for each x ∈ X . The BC is
used n times in a memoryless manner. If no communication
takes place, the warden at receiver Z observes Zn, which is
distributed according to Q×n0 , the n-fold product distribution
of Q0. If communication occurs, the warden observes QˆZn ,
the output distribution induced by the code. For convenience,
in the sequel, we often denote the two marginal channels
corresponding to the two legitimate receivers as W = PY1|X
and V = PY2|X respectively.
The transmitter and the receivers are assumed to share a
secret key S uniformly distributed over a set K. We will, for
the most part, assume that the key is sufficiently long, i.e., the
set K is sufficiently large. However, we will bound the length
of the key in Section III-E. The transmitter and the receiver
aim to construct a code that is both reliable and covert. Let
the messages to be sent be W1 and W2. These messages are
assumed to be independent and also independent of S. Also
let their reconstructions at the receiver Yj be Wˆj for j = 1, 2.
As usual, a code is said to be reliable if the probability
of error Pr(∪2j=1{Wˆj 6= Wj}) vanishes as n → ∞. The
code is covert if it is difficult for the warden to determine
whether the transmitter is sending a message (hypothesis
H1) or not (hypothesis H0). Let pi1|0 and pi0|1 denote the
probabilities of false alarm (accepting H1 when the transmitter
is not sending a message) and missed detection (accepting
H0 when the transmitter is sending a message), respectively.
Note that a blind test (one with no side information) satisfies
pi1|0 +pi0|1 = 1. The warden’s optimal hypothesis test satisfies
pi1|0 + pi0|1 = 1− V(QˆZn , Q×n0 ) (3)
≥ 1−
√
D(QˆZn‖Q×n0 ), (4)
where (4) follows by Pinsker’s inequality; see [8], [32]. Hence,
covertness is guaranteed if the relative entropy between the ob-
served distribution QˆZn and the product of no communication
distribution Q×n0 is bounded by a small δ > 0.
Note that if supp(PZ|X(·|x)) * supp(Q0) for some x ∈ X ,
such x should not be transmitted, otherwise it is not possible
for D(QˆZn‖Q×n0 ) to vanish [9]. Hence, by dropping all such
input symbols as well as all output symbols not included in
supp(Q0), we assume throughout that supp(Q0) = Z . In ad-
dition, we assume that the no-input symbol 0 is not redundant
i.e., PZ|X(·|0) /∈ conv{PZ|X(·|x′) : x′ ∈ X , x′ 6= 0} where
conv{·} denotes the convex hull. If the symbol 0 is redundant,
there exists a sequence of codes for which D(QˆZn‖Q×n0 ) = 0
1We omit the qualifier “discrete memoryless” for brevity in the sequel.
We will mostly discuss discrete memoryless BCs in this paper. However, in
Corollary 2, we present results for the BC with a warden when the constituent
channels are Gaussian.
for all n [9] so pi1|0+pi0|1 = 1 (i.e., the warden’s test is always
blind) and transmitting at positive rates is possible; this is a
regime we do not consider in this paper.
A code for the BC with a covertness constraint and the
covert capacity region are defined formally as follows.
Definition 1. An (n,M1n,M2n,Kn, ε, δ)-code for the BC
with a warden (X ,Y1,Y2,Z, PY1,Y2,Z|X) and with a covert-
ness constraint consists of
• Two message sets Mj := {1, . . . ,Mjn} for j = 1, 2;
• Two independent messages uniformly distributed over
their respective message sets, i.e., Wj ∼ Unif(Mj) for
j = 1, 2;
• One secret key set K := {1, . . . ,Kn};
• One encoder f :M1n ×M2n ×K → Xn;
• Two decoders ϕj : Ynj ×K →Mj for j = 1, 2;
such that the following constraints hold:
Pr
( ∪2j=1 {Wˆj 6= Wj}) ≤ ε, (5)
D(QˆZn‖Q×n0 ) ≤ δ. (6)
For most of our discussion, we ignore the secret key set
(i.e., we assume that the secret key is sufficiently long) for the
sake of simplicity and refer to the family of codes above with
secret key sets of arbitrary sizes as (n,M1n,M2n, ε, δ)-codes.
We will revisit the effect of the key size in Section III-E.
Definition 2. We say that the pair (L1, L2) ∈ R2+ is (ε, δ)-
achievable for the BC with a warden and with a covertness
constraint if there exists a sequence of (n,M1n,M2n, εn, δ)-
codes such that
lim inf
n→∞
1√
nδ
logMjn ≥ Lj , j ∈ {1, 2}, (7)
lim sup
n→∞
εn ≤ ε. (8)
Define the (ε, δ)-covert capacity region Lε,δ ⊂ R2+ to be
the closure of all (ε, δ)-achievable pairs of (L1, L2). We are
interested in the δ-covert capacity region
Lδ :=
⋂
ε∈(0,1)
Lε,δ = lim
ε→0
Lε,δ. (9)
Note that L1 and L2 in (7) are measured in bits (or
information units) per square root channel use.
We will also need the notion of covert capacities for point-
to-point discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) with a warden
(X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X) [8], [9]. This scenario corresponds to the
above definitions with Y1 = Y and Y2 = ∅. Recall that the
chi-squared distance between two distributions Q0 and Q1
supported on the same alphabet Z is defined as
χ2(Q1‖Q0) :=
∑
z∈Z
(Q1(z)−Q0(z))2
Q0(z)
. (10)
Theorem 1 (Bloch [8] and Wang, Wornell, Zheng [9]). Let
(X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X) be a DMC with a warden in which W :=
PY |X and Qk := PZ|X(·|k) for k ∈ X . We assume that it
5satisfies W (·|k)W (·|0) for all k ∈ X\{0}, supp(Q0) = Z
and 0 ∈ X is not redundant. Then its covert capacity is
L∗(PY,Z|X) := max
p
√√√√2(∑Kk=1 pkD(W (·|k)‖W (·|0)))2
χ2
(∑K
k=1 pkQk
∥∥Q0)
(11)
where the maximization extends over all length-K probability
vectors p (i.e., p = [p1, . . . , pK ]T where pk ≥ 0 and∑K
k=1 pk = 1). If X = {0, 1}, i.e., PY,Z|X has a binary input,
then the maximization over p in (11) is unnecessary and
L∗(PY,Z|X) :=
√
2D(W (·|1)‖W (·|0))2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) . (12)
As previously mentioned, we assume that Q1  Q0 in
the binary input case (or more generally,
∑K
k=1 p
∗
kQk  Q0
where p∗ = [p∗1, . . . , p
∗
K ]
T is any maximizer of (11)). Oth-
erwise, covert communication is impossible [8, Appendix G].
With this assumption and the fact that 0 ∈ X is not redundant,
L∗(PY,Z|X) as defined in (11) and (12) is finite.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. In Section III-A,
we state a condition on BCs, which we call Condition 1.
In Section III-B, we state our main result assuming the BC
satisfies Condition 1 and the key is of sufficiently long length.
We interpret our result in Section III-C by placing it in context
via several remarks. In Section III-D, we specialize our result
to two degraded BCs and show that standard techniques apply
for such models. In Section III-E, we extend our main result
to the case where the key size is also a parameter of interest.
A. A Condition on BCs
In the following, we consider the following condition on
BCs that allows us to show that time-division is optimal.
Condition 1. Fix a BC with a warden PY1,Y2,Z|X . Let
the covert capacities of PY1,Z|X and PY2,Z|X be L
∗
1 :=
L∗(PY1,Z|X) and L
∗
2 := L
∗(PY2,Z|X) respectively.
• If L∗1 ≥ L∗2, we assume that
max
PX
I(X;Y1)
I(X;Y2)
≤ L
∗
1
L∗2
(13)
• Otherwise if L∗2 ≥ L∗1, we assume that
max
PX
I(X;Y2)
I(X;Y1)
≤ L
∗
2
L∗1
(14)
A few remarks concerning Condition 1 are in order.
1) Condition 1, which is easy to check numerically as the
optimizations over PX are over compact sets, neither
subsumes nor is subsumed by degradedness or any other
ordering of W = PY1|X and V = PY2|X . That is, we
can show that there exists some degraded BCs that do not
satisfy Condition 1 and there are also non-degraded BCs
that satisfy Condition 1.
2) Condition 1 is significantly simplified in the binary-input
case. Let W = PY1|X , V = PY2|X , and Wγ(y) :=
q0
q
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Fig. 3. The set of values of (q0, q1) ∈ [0, 1]2 (parameters of the matrix V
in (17)) such that Condition 1 is satisfied (resp. not satisfied) is indicated in
gray (resp. white).
∑
x∈X Pγ(x)W (y|x), y ∈ Y where Pγ is the Bernoulli
distribution with probability of 1 being γ ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
Pγ(x) :=
{
1− γ x = 0
γ x = 1
. (15)
Similarly define Vγ . Then, one can use (12) and Lemma 1
(to follow) to show that (13) is equivalent to
D(W1‖W0)
D(V1‖V0) ≤ minγ∈[0,1]
D(Wγ‖W0)
D(Vγ‖V0) . (16)
Thus the verification of Condition 1 for binary-input BCs
reduces to a line search over [0, 1].
3) To illustrate this condition, we consider the scenario in
which2 W = BSC(p) where p ∈ {0.01, 0.20} and V is a
(generally) asymmetric binary-input, binary-output channel
such that the transition matrix reads
V =
[
1− q0 q0
q1 1− q1
]
, (17)
for q0, q1 ∈ [0, 1]. In Fig. 3, we show the range of values
of (q0, q1) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that Condition 1 is satisfied
(indicated in gray). Also we note that the “diagonal” values
of (q0, q1) in which q0 = q1 satisfy Condition 1. Hence, if
V is a BSC, Condition 1 is satisfied. More generally, we
can verify numerically that if W and V are both BSCs, then
Condition 1, or equivalently (16) for the case L∗1 ≥ L∗2, is
satisfied.
B. Time-Division is Optimal for Some BCs
Our main result is a complete characterization of the δ-
covert capacity region for all BCs satisfying Condition 1 and
certain absolute continuity conditions.
Theorem 2. Assume that a BC with a warden PY1,Y2,Z|X is
such that Condition 1 is satisfied and the constituent DMCs
W := PY1|X and V := PY2|X satisfy W (·|k)  W (·|0) and
V (·|k)  V (·|0) for all k ∈ X \ {0}. Also assume that the
2We use the notation W = BSC(q) if it is a binary-input, binary-output
channel in which Y = X ⊕Ψ where Ψ ∼ Bern(q).
6length of the secret key is sufficiently large. Then, for all δ > 0,
the δ-covert capacity region is
Lδ =
{
(L1, L2) ∈ R2+ :
L1
L∗1
+
L2
L∗2
≤ 1
}
. (18)
Theorem 2 is proved in Section IV.
C. Remarks on the Main Theorem
A few remarks are in order.
1) First, note that (18) implies that under the covert commu-
nication constraints, time-division transmission is optimal
for all BCs satisfying Condition 1. The achievability part
simply involves two optimal covert communication codes,
one for each DMC with a warden. The first code, designed
for PY1,Z|X , is employed over bρnc channel uses where
ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The second code, designed for PY2,Z|X , is
employed over the remaining n − bρnc channel uses.
However, because the normalization of logMjn is
√
nδ,
we need a slightly more subtle time-division argument. To
do so, fix δ′ < δ, then from Theorem 1, we know that there
exists a sequence of codes that allows transmission of
logM1n ∼=
√
ρnδ′L∗1 (19)
bits for user 1 over bρnc channel uses and with covertness
constraint (upper bound of the divergence in (6)) δ′ and
logM2n ∼=
√
(1− ρ)n(δ − δ′)L∗2 (20)
bits for user 2 over n−bρnc channel uses and with covert-
ness constraint δ − δ′. Choosing δ′ = ρδ and combining
these two codes, achieves the covertness constraint δ and
the rate point (ρL∗1, (1−ρ)L∗2) which is on the boundary of
Lδ . By varying ρ ∈ [0, 1], we achieve the whole boundary
and hence the entire region in (18).
Note that time-division is strictly suboptimal for the vast
majority of BCs in the absence of the covert communica-
tion constraint. Indeed, one needs to perform superposition
coding [30] to achieve all points in the capacity region
for degraded, less noisy and more capable BCs. Thus, the
covert communication constraint significantly simplifies the
optimal coding scheme for BCs satisfying Condition 1.
2) The converse of Theorem 2 thus constitutes the main
contribution of this paper. To obtain an explicit outer bound
for the capacity region for BCs that satisfy some ordering—
such as degraded, less noisy or more capable BCs [10,
Chapter 5]—one often has to resort to the identification
of the optimal auxiliary random variable-channel input
pair (U,X) in the capacity region of these classes of
BCs. However, this is only possible for specific BCs;
see Corollaries 1 and 2 to follow. For general (or even
arbitrary degraded) BCs, this is, in general, not possible.
Our workaround involves first starting with an outer bound
of the capacity region for general memoryless BCs by
El Gamal [25]. We combine the inequalities in the outer
bounds and use this to upper bound a linear combination of
the two throughputs in terms of the concave envelope of a
linear combination of mutual information terms [26]. This
allows us to circumvent the need to explicitly characterize
(U,X) since U is no longer present in this concave
envelope characterization. We then exploit Condition 1 and
some approximations to obtain the desired the outer bound
to (18). The appeal of this approach is not only that we do
not need to find the optimal (U,X).
3) Let us say that the absolute continuity condition holds for
W if W (·|k)W (·|0) for all k ∈ X \{0}. Then Bloch [8,
Appendix G] showed that if W does not satisfy the absolute
continuity condition, Θ(
√
n log n) bits per n channel uses
can be covertly transmitted. In our setting, the same is true
for the constituent channels; if W satisfies the absolute
continuity condition but V does not, Θ(
√
n) bits per n
channel uses can be transmitted to Y1, while Θ(
√
n log n)
bits per n channel uses can be transmitted to Y2.
4) Finally, suppose that the covertness condition in (6) is
replaced by a total variation constraint of the form
V(QˆZn , Q×n0 ) ≤ δ, for some δ ∈ (0, 1). (21)
Then, by using the techniques to prove [33, Theorem 2],
one can easily see that the covert capacity region is the
same as (18) in Theorem 2 except that in the formula-
tion, (7) is replaced by
lim inf
n→∞
1√
nΓδ
logMjn ≥ Lj , j ∈ {1, 2}, (22)
where Γδ :=
√
2Q−1( 1−δ2 ) and Q(·) is the complementary
cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian.
Hence, only the normalization (or scaling) is different.
Since the justification of this is completely analogous to
that of (the first-order result of) [33, Theorem 2], we omit
the proof for the sake of brevity.
D. Two Degraded BCs
We now consider two specific classes of degraded BCs and
show that modifications of standard techniques are applicable
in establishing the outer bound to Lδ .
Corollary 1. Suppose that W = BSC(p1) and V = BSC(p2)
with 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ 1/2 (without loss of generality) [10,
Example 5.3]. Then Lδ is as in (18) with
L∗j = (log e)(1−2pj) log
1− pj
pj
·
√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) , j ∈ {1, 2}.
(23)
An converse proof of this result follows from Mrs. Gerber’s
lemma [27] and is presented in Section V-A. This result
generalizes [9, Example 3].
We now consider the scenario in which the BC PY1,Y2,Z|X
consists of three additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels [10, Sec. 5.5], i.e.,
Yj = X + Ψj , j ∈ {1, 2} (24)
Z = X + Ψ3, (25)
where Ψ1,Ψ2, and Ψ3 are independent zero-mean Gaussian
noises with variances N1, N2, and σ2 respectively. There is
no (peak, average, or long-term) power constraint on the
codewords [9, Sec. V]. Let the “no communication” input
7symbol be 0 ∈ R, so by (25), Q0 is distributed as a zero-
mean Gaussian with variance σ2.
Corollary 2. Suppose that W and V be AWGN channels as
in (24) with noise variances satisfying 0 ≤ N1 ≤ N2 (without
loss of generality). Then Lδ is as in (18) with
L∗j =
σ2 log e
Nj
, j ∈ {1, 2}. (26)
The converse proof follows from the entropy power inequal-
ity [28], [29] and is presented in Section V-B. This result
generalizes [8, Theorem 6] and [9, Theorem 5]. It is also
analogous to [24, Prop. 1] in which it was shown that time-
division is optimal for Gaussian BCs in the low-power limit.
We note that Corollaries 1 and 2 apply to an arbitrary but fi-
nite number of successively degraded legitimate receivers [10,
Sec. 5.7], say N . This means that X (− Y1 (− Y2 (−
. . .(− YN . The corresponding δ-covert capacity region is
Lδ =
{
(L1, . . . , LN ) ∈ RN+ :
N∑
j=1
Lj
L∗j
≤ 1
}
, (27)
where L∗j is given as in (23) or (26). We omit the proofs as
they are straightforward generalizations of the corollaries.
E. On the Length of the Secret Key
In the preceding derivations, we have assumed that the
secret key that the transmitter and legitimate receivers share is
arbitrarily long. In other words, the set K is sufficiently large.
In this section, we derive fundamental limits on the length of
the key so that covert communication remains successful.
To formalize this, we will need to augment Definition 2. We
say that (L1, L2, Lkey) is δ-achievable or simply achievable
if in addition to (7) and (8) (with ε = 0),
lim sup
n→∞
1√
nδ
logKn ≤ Lkey. (28)
Finally, we set L∗Z := L
∗(PZ,Z|X). The generalization of
Theorem 2 is as follows.
Theorem 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, the tuple
(L1, L2, Lkey) ∈ R3+ is achievable if and only if
L1
L∗1
+
L2
L∗2
≤ 1 (29)
and
Lkey ≥
(
L1
L∗1
+
L2
L∗2
)
L∗Z − L1 − L2. (30)
Note that if the throughputs of the code (logM1n, logM2n)
are such that we operate on the boundary of the covert capacity
region (i.e., that (29) holds with equality), the optimum
(minimum) key length
L∗key = L
∗
Z − L1 − L2. (31)
Also note that if Lkey is sufficiently large, then (30) is satisfied
so based on (29), Theorem 3 reverts to Theorem 2. The proof
of this enhanced theorem follows largely along the same lines
as that for Theorem 2. However, we need to carefully bound
the length of the secret key. The additional arguments to
complete the proof of Theorem 3 are provided in Section VI.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
A. Preliminaries for the Proof of Theorem 2
Before we commence, we recap some basic notions in con-
vex analysis. The (upper) concave envelope of f : D → R, de-
noted as C[f ](x) := inf{g(x) : g ≥ f over D, g is concave},
is the smallest concave function lying above f . If D is a subset
of Rd, then by Carathe´odory’s theorem [26],
g = C[f ] ⇐⇒ g(x) = sup
{(xi,pi)}d+1i=1
d+1∑
i=1
pif(xi), (32)
where xi ∈ D and {pi}d+1i=1 is a probability distribution such
that
∑d+1
i=1 pixi = x. Here, we record a basic fact:
f2 ≥ f1 on D =⇒ g2 ≥ g1 on D (33)
where gj = C[fj ], j = 1, 2. This can be shown by means of
the representation of the concave envelope in (32). Indeed,
g2(x) ≥
d+1∑
i=1
pif2(xi) ≥
d+1∑
i=1
pif1(xi) (34)
where the first inequality holds for any {(xi, pi)}d+1i=1 such that∑d+1
i=1 pixi = x and the second inequality because f2 ≥ f1
on D. Since the inequality holds for all {(xi, pi)}d+1i=1 such
that
∑d+1
i=1 pixi = x, we can take the supremum of the right-
hand-side of (34) over all such {(xi, pi)}d+1i=1 to conclude that
g2 ≥ g1 on D.
B. Converse Proof of Theorem 2: Binary-Input BCs
We first prove the converse to Theorem 2 for the case
when X = {0, 1}. This is done for the sake of clarity and
simplicity. We subsequently show how to extend the analysis
to the multiple symbol case (i.e., |X | > 2) in Section IV-C. Fix
a sequence of (n,M1n,M2n, εn, δ)-codes for the BC with a
warden PY1,Y2,Z|X satisfying the 0-reliability constraint in (5)
and (8) and the covertness constraint in (6). In the proof, we
use the following result by Bloch [8, Lemma 1, Remark 1]:
Lemma 1. Let Qγ(z) :=
∑
x∈X PZ|X(z|x)Pγ(x) for γ ∈
[0, 1] where Pγ is defined in (15). Then, it follows that
I(Pγ , PZ|X) = γD(Q1‖Q0)−D(Qγ‖Q0). (35)
Furthermore, for any sequence γn such that γn → 0 as n→
∞, for all n sufficiently large,
γ2n
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) (1−√γn) ≤ D(Qγn‖Q0)
≤ γ
2
n
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) (1 +√γn) . (36)
1) Covertness Constraint: We first discuss the covertness
constraint in (6). Let Zn (resp. Xn) have distribution QˆZn
(resp. PˆXn ) and let QˆZi (resp. PˆXi ) be the marginal of QˆZn
(resp. PˆXn ) on the i-th element. Additionally, let Q¯n be the
average output distribution on Z , i.e., Q¯n := 1n
∑n
i=1 QˆZi .
Similarly we define the average input distribution P¯n on X
as P¯n := 1n
∑n
i=1 PˆXi . Then mimicking the steps in the proof
of [9, Theorem 1], we have
D(QˆZn‖Q×n0 ) ≥ nD(Q¯n‖Q0). (37)
8Thus, by the covertness constraint in (6) and (37), we have
D(Q¯n‖Q0) ≤ δ
n
. (38)
Since limn→0D(Q¯n‖Q0) = 0 and symbol 0 ∈ X is not
redundant,3 it follows that
P¯n = Pαn for some αn → 0. (39)
Because Q¯n(z) = Qαn(z) for all z ∈ Z , by Lemma 1,
α2n
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) (1−√αn) ≤ D(Q¯n‖Q0)
≤ α
2
n
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) (1 +√αn) . (40)
From (38) and (40), we conclude that αn has to satisfy the
weight constraint
α2n (1−
√
αn) ≤ 2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)n =: α¯
2
n. (41)
From this relation, we see that αn ≤ α¯n(1 + o(1)) = Θ( 1√n ).
2) Upper Bound on Linear Combination of Code Sizes:
We now proceed to consider upper bounds on the code sizes
subject to the reliability and covertness constraints. Without
loss of generality, we assume L∗1 ≥ L∗2. We start with a lemma
that is a direct consequence of the converse proof for more
capable BCs by El Gamal [25]. This lemma is stated in a
slightly different manner in [10, Theorem 8.5].
Lemma 2. Every (n,M1n,M2n, εn)-code for any BC satisfies
(logM1n)(1− εn)− 1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(U1i;Y1i), (42)
(logM2n)(1− εn)− 1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(U2i;Y2i), (43)
(logM1n + logM2n)(1− εn)− 2
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Y1i|U2i) + I(U2i;Y2i)
]
, (44)
(logM1n + logM2n)(1− εn)− 2
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(U1i;Y1i) + I(Xi;Y2i|U1i)
]
, (45)
where U1i := (W1, Y i−11 , Y
n
2,i+1) and U2i :=
(W2, Y
n
1,i+1, Y
i−1
2 ) satisfies (U1i, U2i) (− Xi (−
(Y1i, Y2i). In addition, if a secret key S is available to the
encoders and decoder, then the auxiliary random variables
U1i and U2i also include S.
For completeness, the proof of Lemma 2, with the effect
of the secret key, is provided in Appendix A. Note that no
assumption (e.g., degradedness, less noisy or more capable
conditions) is made on the BC in Lemma 2.
3Indeed, if 0 were redundant (e.g., PZ|X(·|0) = PZ|X(·|1) for binary X ),
there exists an input distribution P˜ such that P˜ (0) = 0 and its corresponding
output distribution Q˜ =
∑
x P˜ (x)PZ|X(·|x) = Q0 [9, Eqn. (5)]. The
distribution Q˜ (taking the role of Q¯n) satisfies D(Q˜‖Q0) = 0 so (38)
is trivially satisfied. However, P˜ (taking the role of P¯n) clearly does not
satisfy (39).
Now fix a constant λ ≥ 1. By adding (λ − 1) copies
of (43) to one copy of (44) and writing Ui := U2i for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we obtain
(logM1n + λ logM2n)(1− εn)− (1 + λ)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Y1i|Ui) + λI(Ui;Y2i)
]
. (46)
By introducing the usual time-sharing random variable J ∈
Unif{1, . . . , n} which is independent of all the other random
variables (W1,W2, Xn, Y n1 , Y
n
2 ) and defining U := (J, UJ),
X := XJ , Y1 := Y1J and Y2 := Y2J , we obtain
(logM1n + λ logM2n)(1− εn)− (1 + λ)
≤ nI(X;Y1|U) + nλI(U ;Y2). (47)
Note that the above identification of (U,X) satisfies U (−
X (− (Y1, Y2). Furthermore, since X is equal to Xi for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with equal probability 1/n (because of X =
XJ ), it follows PX = P¯n = Pαn for some αn satisfying (41).
Hence, (47) can be bounded by taking a maximization over
all such distributions, i.e.,
1
n
[
(logM1n + λ logM2n)(1− εn)− (1 + λ)
]
≤ max
PX
max
PU|X
I(X;Y1|U) + λI(U ;Y2), (48)
where the maximization over PX is over distributions Pαn
where αn satisfies (41).
Now by using the concave envelope representation for the
capacity region of degraded BCs [26], we may write (47) as
follows:
1
n
[
(logM1n + λ logM2n)(1− εn)− (1 + λ)
]
≤ max
PX
max
PU|X
I(X;Y1|U) + λI(U ;Y2) (49)
= max
PX
max
PU|X
I(X;Y1|U) + λ[I(X;Y2)− I(X;Y2|U)] (50)
= max
PX
λI(X;Y2) + max
PU|X
I(X;Y1|U)− λI(X;Y2|U) (51)
= max
PX
λI(X;Y2) + CPX [I(X;Y1)− λI(X;Y2)]. (52)
Here, (50) follows from the Markov chain U (− X (− Y2
and (52) follows from the definition of the concave envelope.
Namely, for fixed PX ,
max
PU|X
I(X;Y1|U)− λI(X;Y2|U)
=max
PU|X
∑
u
PU (u)[I(X;Y1|U=u)−λI(X;Y2|U=u)] (53)
=max
PU|X
∑
u
PU (u)[I(PX|U (·|u),W )−λI(PX|U (·|u), V )] (54)
=CPX [I(X;Y1)− λI(X;Y2)], (55)
where (54) follows from the Markov chain U (−
X (− (Y1, Y2) and (55) follows from the fact that∑
u PU (u)PX|U (·|u) = PX and (32). Note that we employ
the subscript PX on C to emphasize that the concave envelope
operation is taken with respect to the distribution PX and it
is thus a function of PX .
93) Approximating the Maximization over Low-Weight In-
puts: Due to the above considerations, it now suffices to
simplify (52). To obtain the outer bound to (18), we set
λ := L∗1/L
∗
2 in the following. Note that since it is assumed
that L∗1 ≥ L∗2, λ ≥ 1 as required to obtain (46). If instead
L∗2 > L
∗
1, then we set λ := L
∗
2/L
∗
1 and add (λ − 1) copies
of (42) to one copy of (45) to obtain the analogue of (46) with
Ui := U1i. We also use (14) instead of (13) in Condition 1.
Finally, in the rest of the proof, we replace the index 1 by 2
and W by V and vice versa. The following arguments go
through verbatim with these minor amendments.
By expressing the mutual information quantities in (52) as
I(PX ,W ) and I(PX , V ) [31] (for I(X;Y1) and I(X;Y2)
respectively), we can write (52) as follows:
max
PX
λI(PX , V ) + CPX [I(PX ,W )− λI(PX , V )]. (56)
By applying (13) of Condition 1, we see that I(PX ,W )−
λI(PX , V ) ≤ 0 for all PX . Hence, by using the monotonicity
property in (33) and the fact that the concave envelope of the
0 function is 0, we obtain that (56) is upper bounded by
max
PX
λI(PX , V ) (57)
Now we parametrize PX = Pαn = P¯n as the vector [1 −
αn, αn]
T where 0 ≤ αn ≤ α¯n(1 + o(1)) [cf. (41)]. Appealing
to Lemma 1, we see that the value of the optimization problem
in (57) is given by
λα¯n(1 + o(1)) ·D(V (·|1)‖V (·|0)). (58)
Now, combining (56)–(58) with the upper bound in (52), we
have
1
n
[
(logM1n + λ logM2n)(1− εn)− (1 + λ)
]
≤ λα¯n(1 + o(1)) ·D(V (·|1)‖V (·|0)). (59)
4) Completing the Converse Proof Taking Limits: At this
point, we invoke the definition of α¯n in (41) and normal-
ize (59) by
√
nδ to obtain
1√
nδ
[
(logM1n + λ logM2n)(1− εn)− (1 + λ)
]
≤ λ(1 + o(1))
√
2δn
χ2(Q1‖Q0)δn ·D(V (·|1)‖V (·|0)). (60)
Taking the lim sup in n on both sides, recalling that (i)
λ = L∗1/L
∗
2 and (ii) the definition of achievable (L1, L2)
pairs according to Definition 2, and the facts that εn → 0
and nδ →∞, we obtain
L1 +
L∗1
L∗2
L2 ≤ L
∗
1
L∗2
√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) ·D(V (·|1)‖V (·|0)). (61)
Finally, by recalling the definition of the covert capacity of
PY2,Z|X according to (12) in Theorem 1, we see that the right-
hand-side of (61) is exactly L∗1. Hence we obtain the desired
outer bound corresponding to Lδ in (18) in Theorem 2.
C. Converse Proof of Theorem 2: BCs with Multiple Inputs
We generalize the converse proof for binary-input in Sec-
tion IV-B to the multiple symbol case, i.e., |X | > 2. We use
the following lemma whose proof is in [8, Section VII-B].
Lemma 3. For γ ∈ [0, 1] and length-K probability vector p =
[p1, . . . , pK ]
T , i.e., pk ≥ 0 and
∑K
k=1 pk = 1, let Qγ,p(z) :=∑
x∈X PZ|X(z|x)Pγ,p(x) where
Pγ,p(x) :=
{
1− γ x = 0
γpk x = k ∈ X \ {0} . (62)
Then, it follows that
I(Pγ,p, PZ|X)=
( K∑
k=1
γpkD(Qk‖Q0)
)
−D(Qγ,p‖Q0). (63)
Furthermore, for any sequence γn such that γn → 0 as n→
∞, for all n sufficiently large,
γ2n
2
χ2
( K∑
k=1
pkQk
∥∥∥∥Q0) (1−√γn) ≤ D(Qγn,p‖Q0)
≤ γ
2
n
2
χ2
( K∑
k=1
pkQk
∥∥∥∥Q0) (1 +√γn) (64)
1) Covertness Constraint: By a close inspection of the
steps in Section IV-B1 and by applying Lemma 3, we conclude
that the average input distribution P¯n is given by Pαn,p for
some length-K probability vector p and αn such that
α2n (1−
√
αn) ≤ 2δ
χ2
(∑K
k=1 pkQk
∥∥Q0)n =: α¯2p,n. (65)
2) Upper Bound on Linear Combination of Code Sizes:
Let us assume L∗1 ≥ L∗2 (without loss of generality), then
λ = L∗1/L
∗
2 ≥ 1. It can be easily checked that the steps in
Section IV-B2 go through in the same manner for the multiple
symbol case except that PX = Pαn,p for some length-K
probability vector p and αn ∈ [0, 1] satisfying (65). As such,
we have that (52) also holds where now the maximization
over PX is over those distributions Pαn,p for some p and αn
satisfying (65).
3) Approximating the Maximization over Low-Weight In-
puts: Now we approximate (56). We fix p throughout. By
Condition 1, I(PX ,W ) − λI(PX , V ) ≤ 0 and so only the
first term λI(PX , V ) remains in the maximization. Similarly
to (58), the maximization in (56) can be approximated by
λα¯p,n(1 + o(1))
K∑
k=1
pkD(V (·|k)‖V (·|0)) (66)
as n→∞.
Due to the same reasoning up to (59), we have
1
n
[
(logM1n + λ logM2n)(1− εn)− (1 + λ)
]
≤ λα¯p,n(1 + o(1)) ·
( K∑
k=1
pkD(V (·|k)‖V (·|0))
)
. (67)
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4) Completing the Converse Proof Taking Limits: By sub-
stituting λ = L∗1/L
∗
2 and α¯p,n defined in (65) into (67), taking
limits as in Section IV-B4, and subsequently maximizing over
all probability vectors p on X \ {0}, we obtain
L1 +
L∗1
L∗2
L2 ≤ L
∗
1
L∗2
max
p
√√√√2(∑Kk=1 pkD(V (·|k)‖V (·|0)))2
χ2
(∑K
k=1 pkQk
∥∥Q0)
= L∗1. (68)
This completes the proof for the multiple symbol case.
V. PROOFS OF COROLLARIES IN SECTION III-D
A. Proof of Corollary 1
As the the capacity region of the stochastically degraded
BC is the same as that of the physically degraded BC with the
same marginals [10, Sec. 5.4] even under the covertness con-
straint, we assume that the physically degradedness condition
holds, i.e., Y1 = X⊕Ψ1, Y2 = Y1⊕Ψ˜2 where Ψ˜2 ∼ Bern(p˜2)
such that p1 ∗ p˜2 = p2.
We follow the exposition in [10, Sec. 5.4.2] closely. By the
standard argument to establish the weak converse for degraded
BCs [34], we know that every (n,M1n,M2n, εn)-code for a
BC must satisfy
(logM1n)(1− εn)− 1 ≤ nI(X;Y1|U) (69)
(logM2n)(1− εn)− 1 ≤ nI(U ;Y2), (70)
for some U (− X (− (Y1, Y2) in which X satisfies the
weight constraint in (41), i.e., PX = Pαn or E[X] = αn. We
now evaluate the region in (69)–(70) explicitly in terms of the
channel parameters and the upper bound on the weight of X .
Now we have
hb(p2) = H(Y2|X) (71)
= H(Y2|U,X) ≤ H(Y2|U) ≤ H(Y2) (72)
= hb(αn ∗ p2), (73)
where the equality in (72) follows from the Markov chain
U (− X (− Y2 and (73) follows from the fact that the
entropy of Y2 = X⊕Ψ1⊕Ψ˜2 when E[X] = αn is hb(αn∗p2).
As a result, from (73), there exists a τn ∈ [0, αn] such that
H(Y2|U) = hb(τn ∗ p2). (74)
Then, we have
hb(τn ∗ p2) = H(Y2|U) = H(Y1 ⊕ Ψ˜2|U) (75)
≥ hb
(
h−1b (H(Y1|U)) ∗ p˜2
)
(76)
where (76) follows from the conditional version of Mrs.
Gerber’s lemma [27]. By the monotonicity of hb(·) on [0, 1/2]
and the fact that p1 ∗ p˜2 = p2, we have
τn ∗ p1 ∗ p˜2 ≥ h−1b (H(Y1|U)) ∗ p˜2. (77)
As a result, we have
H(Y1|U) ≤ hb(τn ∗ p1). (78)
Now consider
I(X;Y1|U) = H(Y1|U)−H(Y1|U,X) (79)
= H(Y1|U)− hb(p1) (80)
≤ hb(τn ∗ p1)− hb(p1). (81)
For the other rate bound in (70), we have
I(U ;Y2) = H(Y2)−H(Y2|U) (82)
≤ hb(αn ∗ p2)− hb(τn ∗ p2). (83)
Now, note that for all q ∈ (0, 1/2), ddqhb(q) = (log e) log 1−qq .
By Taylor expanding hb around q, we obtain
hb(q ∗ ξ) = hb(q + (1− 2q)ξ) (84)
= hb(q) + (log e) log
1− q
q
· (1− 2q)ξ +O(ξ2) (85)
as ξ → 0. Now we can simplify the bounds on the right-
hand-sides of (81) and (83). Write αn := a/
√
n and τn :=
t/
√
n where t ∈ [0, a] and a := (1 + o(1))√2δ/χ2(Q1‖Q0);
see (41) for the relation between αn and an upper bound on a
function of it given by α¯n. By combining (69), (70), (81), (83),
and (85), we obtain the outer bound
1
n
[
(logM1n)(1− εn)− 1
]
≤ (log e)(1− 2p1) log 1− p1
p1
· t√
n
+O
(
1
n
)
(86)
1
n
[
(logM2n)(1− εn)− 1
]
≤ (log e)(1− 2p2) log 1− p2
p2
· a− t√
n
+O
(
1
n
)
. (87)
By dividing the first and second bounds by (log e)(1 −
2p1) log
1−p1
p1
and (log e)(1 − 2p2) log 1−p2p2 respectively,
adding them, multiplying the resultant expression by
√
n/δ,
and taking limits, we immediately recover the outer bound to
Lδ with L∗j defined in (23).
B. Proof of Corollary 2
The proof follows similarly to that of Corollary 1 but we
use the entropy power inequality [28], [29] in place of Mrs.
Gerber’s lemma. As in the proof of Corollary 1, we assume
physically degradedness, i.e., Y1 = X + Ψ1, Y2 = Y1 + Ψ˜2
where Ψ˜2 is independent zero-mean Gaussian noise with
variance N2 − N1. Let the second moment of the input
distribution be denoted as αn = E[X2]; this plays the role
of the weight of X in the discrete case. The bounds (69)
and (70) clearly still hold so we only have to single-letterize
the two mutual information terms I(X;Y1|U) and I(U ;Y2).
We follow the exposition in [10, Sec. 5.5.2] closely.
First, we have
I(U ;Y2) = h(Y2)− h(Y2|U) (88)
≤ 1
2
log(2pie(αn +N2))− h(Y2|U) (89)
11
where (89) follows from the fact that a Gaussian maximizes
differential entropy over all distributions with the same second
moment. Now note that
1
2
log(2pieN2) = h(Y2|X) (90)
= h(Y2|U,X) ≤ h(Y2|U) ≤ h(Y2) (91)
≤ 1
2
log(2pie(αn +N2)). (92)
As such there exists a τn ∈ [0, αn] such that
h(Y2|U) = 1
2
log(2pie(τn +N2)). (93)
Then, by the conditional form of the entropy power inequal-
ity [28], [29],
h(Y2|U) = h(Y1 + Ψ˜2|U) (94)
≥ 1
2
log
(
22h(Y1|U) + 22h(Ψ˜2|U)
)
(95)
=
1
2
log
(
22h(Y1|U) + 2pie(N2 −N1)
)
. (96)
Thus,
h(Y1|U) ≤ 1
2
log(2pie(τn +N1)). (97)
Now, we are ready to upper bound the mutual information
terms using the above calculations. We have
I(X;Y1|U) = h(Y1|U)− h(Y1|U,X) (98)
≤ 1
2
log(2pie(τn +N1))− 1
2
log(2pieN1) (99)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
τn
N1
)
≤ τn log e
2N1
, (100)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that log(1+t) ≤
t log e for t ≥ −1. Similarly,
I(U ;Y2) = h(Y2)− h(Y2|U) (101)
≤ 1
2
log
(
αn +N2
τn +N2
)
≤ (αn − τn) log e
2(τn +N2)
(102)
≤ (αn − τn) log e
2N2
. (103)
Using the same calculations as those leading to [9, Eqn. (75)],
we conclude that the covert communication constraint in the
Gaussian case translates to
α2n
4σ4
+ o(α2n) ≤
δ
n
. (104)
The proof is completed by uniting (100), (103), and (104) in
a way that is analogous to the conclusion of the proof for the
binary symmetric BC in Section V-A.
VI. PROOF SKETCH OF THEOREM 3
Proof: The achievability in (30) follows by augmenting
the standard time-division argument given in Remark 1 in
Section III-C. More specifically, we let ρ1 := L1/L∗1 and
ρ2 := L2/L
∗
2. Then ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ 1. We use an optimal code for
the first receiver for ρ1 fraction of time, an optimal code for
the second receiver for ρ2 fraction of time, and stay idle for the
remaining fraction of time. Then the required secret key rate4
is ρ1(L∗Z −L∗1) + ρ2(L∗Z −L∗2) as a direct consequence of [8,
Theorem 3], which is equal to the right-hand side of (30).
For the converse, for simplicity, we only consider the
binary-input case; the general case follows from replacing Q1
with
∑K
k=1 pkQk everywhere and P¯n(1) with
∑K
k=1 P¯n(k)
everywhere. We show that there is a tradeoff between the mes-
sage rates and the secret key rate (with normalizations
√
nδ); if
the message rates are in the interior of (18), a strictly smaller
secret key rate is required. To elucidate this tradeoff, let us
consider a rate tuple (L1, L2) such that L1/L∗1 + L2/L
∗
2 = κ
for some κ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that κ strictly less than one means
that the message rates are in the interior of (18).
By applying similar steps as in [8, Eqns. (91)–(94)], we
obtain
logM1n + logM2n + logKn = H(W1,W2, S) (105)
≥ I(W1,W2, S;Zn) ≥ I(Xn;Zn) ≥ nI(X;Z)− δ, (106)
where the final inequality in (106) follows from similar steps
presented in [35, Sec. 5.2.3]. Here X = XJ and Z = ZJ
where J is the time-sharing random variable defined in Sec-
tion IV-B2. Then,
1√
nδ
(logM1n + logM2n + logKn)
≥ 1√
nδ
(nI(X;Z)− δ) (107)
=
nαn√
nδ
(
D(Q1‖Q0)− D(Qαn‖Q0)
αn
− δ
nαn
)
, (108)
where (108) follows from Lemma 1. Note that the lower
bound (108) depends on the “weight” αn = P¯n(1). Hence,
substituting the smallest “weight” αn = P¯n(1) that attains
L1/L
∗
1 + L2/L
∗
2 = κ into (108) results in a lower bound
on the required secret key rate to attain the message rate
pair (L1, L2).
Now let us denote the smallest αn = P¯n(1) that attains
L1/L
∗
1 + L2/L
∗
2 = κ by να¯n.
5 By a close inspection of the
proof of Theorem 2, we can check that under the constraint
αn = να¯n, the message pairs are bounded by L1/L∗1 +
L2/L
∗
2 ≤ ν. Hence, to achieve L1/L∗1 +L2/L∗2 = κ, it should
follow that ν ≥ κ. Indeed, we can see that L1/L∗1+L2/L∗2 = κ
is achievable with weight κα¯n from the direct part above, by
communicating κ fraction of the time and staying idle for the
remaining 1− κ fraction.
Note that when αn = κα¯n, it follows from (36) that
lim
n→∞
D(Qαn‖Q0)
αn
= 0 and lim
n→∞
δ
nαn
= 0. (109)
Then, by combining (108)–(109), we have
lim inf
n→∞
1√
nδ
(logM1n + logM2n + logKn)
≥ κ
√
2D(Q1‖Q0)2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) = κL
∗
Z . (110)
4With a slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to L1, L2, and Lkey as
rates even though they are not communication rates in the usual sense [10].
5We omit mulitplying α¯n by the factor 1 + o(1) as this is inconsequential
in the (asymptotic) arguments that follow.
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Since κ = L1/L∗1 + L2/L
∗
2, (110) immediately implies a
matching converse to (30).
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we established the covert capacity region for
two-user memoryless BCs that satisfy Condition 1. Some-
what surprisingly, the most basic multi-user communication
strategy—time-division transmission—turns out to be optimal
for this class of BCs. Our proof strategy provides further
evidence that the concave envelope characterization of bounds
on capacity regions in network information theory [26] is
convenient and useful.
There are at least three promising avenues for future work.
1) Because we are adopting the average probability of error
formalism in (5), it is likely that the strong converse (in ε)
does not hold as suggested by the argument in Appendix A
of [33]. Verifying that the argument therein indeed extends
to BCs would be a natural avenue for future work. In
addition, proving that a strong converse holds under the
maximum probability of error formalism would also be a
fruitful endeavor.
2) What about the covert capacity region for BCs that do not
satisfy Condition 1? In this case time-division may not be
optimal and a natural avenue for future work would be to
construct schemes to beat the time-division inner bound for
such BCs.
3) What is the covert capacity region for BCs (under appropri-
ate conditions) in which there are more than two legitimate
receivers? While Corollaries 1 and 2 hold for an arbitrary
number of legitimate receivers (see (27)), Theorem 2, and
in particular Lemma 2 in which it hinges on, does not seem
to generalize easily.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: We will only prove (42) and (44) as the other two
bounds follow by swapping indices 1 with 2 and vice versa.
In addition, in this proof, we include the effect of the secret
key S. By Fano’s inequality,
H(Wj |Y nj , S) ≤ εn logMjn + 1, j ∈ {1, 2}. (111)
Because W1 and W2 are uniform and independent of each
other and of S, we have
(logM1n)(1− εn)− 1 ≤ I(W1;Y n1 |S) (112)
(logM1n + logM2n)(1− εn)− 2 ≤ I(W1;Y n1 |W2, S)
+ I(W2;Y
n
2 |S). (113)
We start by single letterizing (112) as follows:
(logM1n)(1− εn)− 1
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|Y i−11 , S) (114)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1, S, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1;Y1i) (115)
=
n∑
i=1
I(U1i;Y1i), (116)
where (116) follows from the identification U1i :=
(W1, S, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1). This proves (42).
Next we single letterize (113) using the steps at the
top of the next page, where (121) follows from the
Csisza´r-sum-identity [10] and the identification U2i :=
(W2, S, Y
n
1,i+1, Y
i−1
2 ) and (122) follows from the fact that Xi
is a function of (W1,W2, S). This proves (44).
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